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For many, 2001 marked a watershed year in Australian foreign policy. It saw Australia 
reach international headlines for its hard-line stance on asylum-seekers in August, while 
the events of the subsequent month saw Australia’s immediate (even enthusiastic) 
commitment to the war on terror and the US-led ‘Coalition of the Willing’ that was to 
take Australian troops from Afghanistan in 2001 to Iraq in 2003. Fundamentally, as 
Michael Wesley has argued, it was 2001 when ‘Australia’s relations with the outside 
world seemed to have changed from those of engagement and openness to watchfulness 
and security’.2 While Australia’s approach to the issues of asylum-seekers and terrorism, 
and security more broadly, had origins that pre-dated the Tampa stand-off and the 
September 11 attacks, 2001 marks a useful starting point for an analysis of Australian 
security discourses and practices. These discourses and practices are significant not only 
in elaborating central dimensions of contemporary Australian foreign policy, but in 
reflecting on Australia’s role in the de-legitimisation of human rights norms regarding 
asylum-seekers and the legitimisation of the war on terror and US foreign policy more 
generally. Given the dynamics of what might be called a ‘race to the bottom’ in asylum-
seeker policy in the West,3
 
 and the scope and implications of US hegemony, these 
developments are important not simply in illuminating Australian foreign and security 
policy processes, but in illuminating important issues in contemporary international 
relations. Crucially, I argue, Australia’s role in both of these developments can be 
understood within the context of the Australian government’s understanding of, and 
approach to, security.    
From 2001 to the present, security has generally been understood in statist, exclusionary 
and militaristic terms in the Australian context. These terms refer here to the centrality of 
the preservation of the state, rather than individuals within it (statism); the emphasis on 
achieving security against rather than with the other (exclusion); and the primacy of 
military responses to potential security ‘threats’ (militarism). Such a conception of 
security may be compared with alternative approaches to security emphasising an 
ultimate concern with individual emancipation or quality of life; with achieving security 
with rather than against the other; and with emphasising non-violent means of achieving 
security.4
 
 While the former understanding of security has arguably dominated the way 
security has been understood in Australia and indeed globally for some time, the extent to 
which such a conception of security has captured the approach to security in the 
contemporary Australian political context is unparalleled in recent times and therefore 
requires some elaboration. To be sure, global events and processes (most notably the 
terrorist attacks in 2001 and 2002) are significant in understanding the prominence of this 
security conception, but I argue here that it is more important to analyse the ways in 
which the Australian government has given meaning to these events.  
Since 2001 the Howard government has invoked security concerning issues marginally 
related (if at all) to traditional state security (asylum-seekers, for example) while also 
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representing the threat posed by terrorism in such a way as to encourage a range of 
political responses that potentially undermine individual security (involvement in conflict 
in Iraq and the strengthening of domestic anti-terror legislation, for example). In short, 
the Howard government has played a crucial role in creating a context in which security 
is primarily understood as involving the (violent) rejection of ethical responsibility to the 
‘other’, and the need for a militarised vigilance in protecting Australia’s security in an 
insecure world. While the Australian government clearly is in a strong position to 
influence the way security is understood in the Australian context, however, the inter-
subjective nature of security means that there are always possibilities for change in the 
way security is understood and realised. This article will first outline the way in which 
security is understood and applied here, before addressing the Australian government’s 
approach to the issues of asylum-seekers and terrorism (in 2001 and 2002), and finally 
identify immanent possibilities for the emergence of alternative, more normatively 
progressive, security discourses and practices in the Australian context.  
 
Security as Political Construction 
 
I argue here that it is imperative to conceive security as a fluid, social construction. By 
this account, security is not considered to have a given meaning that is fixed across time 
and space. This is not imply that security has no ontological content. Security may be 
defined, for example, as ‘freedom from danger or harm’ or ‘the preservation of a group’s 
core values’. Such a definition, however, tells us little about what ‘danger or harm’ might 
mean; which group needs to be protected; by whom or from what threats. Answering 
these more specific questions about security necessarily involves wedding the definition 
of security to a particular security discourse.5 For example, security could be defined as 
the territorial preservation of the state from external threats of a military nature, in a 
manner evocative of a realist security discourse.6 Security might also, however, be 
defined as the emancipation of individuals from unnecessary structural constraints, a 
definition consistent with the Critical Security discourse of security.7
 
 Defining security, 
therefore, is an enterprise that involves making a series of assumptions (must frequently 
described in the language of the referent, agent and nature of threats), about the nature of 
world politics, the extent of ethical responsibility in global politics, what particular values 
are in need of being preserved and what particular ends should be sought. The realist and 
Critical Security discourses of security clearly encourage radically different approaches 
to the realisation of security in international politics, to the extent that achieving or 
advancing security defined in realist terms may be inimical to the realisation of individual 
‘emancipation’.  
In practice, actors in international politics consistently engage in debate about the 
meaning of security in particular contexts, and their practices evoke particular meanings 
or discourses of security in a variety of situations. The Australian government’s approach 
to asylum-seekers, to be explored in more depth later, provides a useful insight into this 
process of contestation and part of the dynamic of ‘securitization’.8 In 2001, the 
Australian government defined boatloads of asylum-seekers as potentially undermining 
Australian sovereignty, and discussed responses to the ‘problem’ of asylum-seekers using 
the language of ‘border protection’ and ‘deterrence’.9 This conception of asylum-seekers 
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positioned security in realist terms, wherein the nation-state was in need of being 
protected from external threats to its territorial integrity. Numerous domestic and 
international actors contested this conceptualisation of asylum-seekers, and indeed the 
Australian government had itself in the past dealt with similar boatloads of asylum-




A crucial question emerges when considering the example of Australia’s recent approach 
to asylum-seekers: is there anything inevitable about conceiving of security in such terms 
(ie as requiring a militarised protection of the state from the threat posed by asylum-
seekers)? Might not security be defined in such a way as to prioritise the needs of 
asylum-seekers? If this were the case, it would certainly follow that the way Australia 
approached asylum-seekers would be markedly different. We need, therefore, to 
recognise that ‘security’ in any given context is a social construction: an inter-
subjectively arrived at series of choices about ethical responsibility, the nature of global 
politics and the relative priority to be given to different values. The important questions 
to follow from this acknowledgement then become: why is security conceived in these 
terms, and through what processes is security constructed in certain contexts? These 
questions are not simply important in understanding Australia’s approach to asylum-
seekers or terrorism, or even the way in which security is constructed in the 
contemporary Australian context. They are important in opening up critical space to 
reflect upon the way security ‘works’ in international relations.11
 
   
Central to the construction of security in any context is the role of power, broadly 
defined. I am particularly concerned here with power defined in structural or discursive 
terms, referring to the ability to construct what constitutes ‘common sense’.12 Certainly, 
this dimension of power intersects in important ways with others: those actors most 
capable of influencing the constitution of the ‘common sense’ of security are often those 
with a material power preponderance over other actors (and thus capable of directly 
silencing marginal voices) or who enjoy a position of accepted institutional primacy that 
serves to grant them political legitimacy and to influence what constitutes ‘good 
behaviour’ in international society.13
 
  
The role of states in international relations is particularly illustrative of intersecting 
dimensions of power. As RBJ Walker has argued, the role and legitimacy of states in 
international relations are underpinned by a ‘common sense’ wherein states are 
conceptualised as necessary and even inevitable forms of political community.14 In 
general, post-positivist literature in international relations has been particularly useful in 
pointing to the production of a ‘common sense’ about security and to the ways in which 
the choices underpinning particular security discourses are obscured to the point that the 
conflation of security with a security discourse is seen as natural or apolitical.15 As such, 
while security and action carried out in its name are often presented as natural or 
inevitable, this meaning of security is based on a series of (often obscured) choices and 
assumptions. Further, understanding how security has come to mean certain things in 
certain contexts requires an analysis of power relations (broadly defined) that enable 
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certain meanings of security to come to prominence while marginalising other security 
conceptions and practices (along with the actors who promote them).  
 
The Australian government has been central to the construction of security in the 
contemporary Australian context. For many, such a conclusion would seem obvious 
given the centrality of states in the international system, and the power that their elected 
representatives have in defining how security should be understood and realised. 
Ascribing necessary primacy to the security representations of state governments in the 
construction of security, however, obscures the inter-subjective nature of security while 
also falling into the trap of positioning states as the only form of political community or 
indeed as the only site of politics in international relations.  
 
While governments do generally occupy a central position in the way in which security is 
conceptualised and addressed through states’ foreign policy, for example, they are also 
constrained in the ways in which they can represent and practice security by both 
international and domestic forces, and by dominant conceptions of history, culture and 
identity within the state itself.16 As such, a state government does not have carte blanche 
to define security in any way it sees fit: it must be attentive to domestic and international 
forces lending themselves towards a particular security discourse. Crucially, the 
recognition of the need to ensure ‘the consent, or at least some degree of acquiescence, 
by the population’17 for security discourses and practices means that governments 
looking to promote these discourses and practices need to go about creating a context in 
which such security conceptions and actions resonate with domestic populations.18 The 
constructed and inter-subjective nature of security means that governments must 
generally go about creating support for particular security conceptions and practices 




In creating support for particular security conceptions and practices, actors engage 
(relatively constantly) in a range of representational strategies that serve to position the 
group in need of being protected and to contest or marginalise other security discourses 
and the voices that advance them. The language used by actors is crucial in this political 
project. Language, as it is understood here, is not incidental to political practice: rather, it 
serves to construct social reality in powerful ways, often simultaneously opening up 
possibilities and closing off opportunities for particular forms or representations of 
political action.20 In focusing in particular on the role of the Australian government in 
constructing security in certain ways, the following analysis bears comparison in scope 
and content to Milliken’s description of significative analyses of foreign policy 
discourses, which are concerned with ‘analysing how an elite’s regime of truth (makes) 
possible certain courses of action by a state…while excluding other policies as 
unintelligible or unworkable or improper’.21 More fundamentally in the context of this 
paper, though, the focus on the government’s language is grounded in an overarching 
attempt to locate ‘how, through a process of interaction, one type of context of another 
emerges’.22 As such, the emphasis on the role of language here combines post-structural 
concerns regarding power-knowledge relationships with constructivist concerns about the 
inter-subjective construction of social reality.   
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Locating the way actors represent or evoke security through language is central not 
simply in illuminating how they approach security, but also in pointing to how they go 
about creating contexts in which certain security discourses resonate with domestic 
populations or with the particular group concerned. 23 This need to ensure resonance is 
further underpinned by the centrality of security to the modern political project. As 
Michael Dillon24 has noted, the provision of security is the central determinant of a 
state’s legitimacy in contemporary international politics. The importance of security in 
this context means that utterances of security may be read as legitimation practices on the 
part of states or as particular forms of representation that serve to order social reality in 
certain ways by defining the identity, values and aspirations of the group in need of being 
protected. 25
 
 Representations of security are, therefore, inherently political: they are based 
on a series of assumptions about the world and the group concerned, and they can serve 
to legitimise certain practices. It is in this context that the security representations of 
actors, most notably through language use, should be read.  
This section has made five principal claims concerning the way security ‘works’ in 
international relations as a basis for the exploration of the construction of security in the 
contemporary Australian context. First, it is imperative to conceive of security as a fluid 
social construction, the meaning of which changes in different spatial and temporal 
contexts. The way in which security is understood, located here in particular discourses 
of security, is crucial in conditioning the practices that subsequently follow. Second, it 
becomes crucial (as a corollary to the above) to investigate the processes through which 
security has been constructed in certain ways. This also allows us to reflect on 
possibilities for the meaning of security to be changed in more normatively progressive 
ways. Third, and by way of a preliminary answer to the question of how certain 
discourses of security come to prominence, the role of power (broadly defined) is a 
central determinant of the meaning of security in particular contexts. The power enjoyed 
by states and their governments (founded upon structural, material and institutional 
bases) allows them a strong capacity to influence the construction of security. Having 
made this point, however, the fourth important point to note is that the inter-subjective 
nature of security and the centrality of security to the political project place limits on 
what political leaders can say and do in the name of security. As such, the political 
leaders of states must be attentive to dominant conceptions of security in the domestic 
population, and to other dimensions of influence operating through international pressure 
or domestic dissent, for example. Finally, language was noted here as an important 
political act, one that may demonstrate the conception of security held by a particular 
actor or allow for contexts to be created in which certain conceptions or practices of 
security are accepted or supported. These points provide us with an overarching 
conception of security as constructed, political, and susceptible to change.     
 
Security in Australian Politics 
 
On coming to power in Australia in 1996 the conservative Coalition government, led by 
Prime Minister John Howard, soon signalled a shift in the way security would be 
conceived and realised in Australian foreign and defence policy. Troubled by what they 
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had perceived as the decline of the rightful primacy of the US alliance; an over-ambitious 
attempt to become part of the Asian region; and the limited capabilities of Australia’s 
military to be deployed regionally or globally, the government began to emphasise almost 
immediately the need for a re-orientation of Australian security policy. In particular, the 
government indicated that it would seek to strengthen its bilateral security relationships, 
particularly with the United States, and that it would adopt a defensive policy of ‘forward 
response’, which would involve a ‘greater emphasis on Australia’s strategic strike and 
forward force-projection capabilities’ and allow for the deployment of Australian forces 
to assist ‘US forces in future military or peace-enforcement operations throughout the 
region’.26 This policy of forward defence, announced in 1998, was criticised as ultimately 
positioning Australia as a ‘regional deputy’ to the United States, which some argued 
would serve to undermine Australia’s regional relationships and give excessive ground to 
the foreign and security policy interests of the US.27 The government also sought to 
distance itself from the previous government’s commitment to ‘good international 
citizenship’, which had positioned Australia’s interests as being best served and advanced 
through commitment to the norms and rules of international society.28 The more narrowly 
defined conception of the national interest emphasised under the Howard government 
(evidenced in the title of its 1997 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade White Paper, 




In general, a number of commentators described the government’s approach to security 
prior to 2001 as an avowedly realist one, ‘marked by a politics of exclusion’30 and 
centred on the territorial preservation of the Australian state from external military threats 
to Australia’s borders.31 As such, the period from 2001 built in important ways upon the 
Howard government’s conception of the world and Australia’s place (and security) in it. 
Indeed, a similar interpretation of Australia’s approach to security and defence was also 
made under the previous Labor government.32 Anthony Burke goes further in arguing 
that a perception of imminent external threats to Australia, encouraging a politics of 
exclusion in order to preserve a narrowly-defined and vulnerable Australian identity, has 
been an enduring feature of Australian foreign policy and of Australia’s political leaders’ 
perception of the world since the establishment of the Australian state.33
 
  
It is important, therefore, to recognise some level of continuity in the way security has 
been conceptualised and addressed in the Australian context. It would be a mistake, 
however, to understate the extent of the alteration in the ways and contexts in which the 
Australian government conceived of security from 2001. While building in important 
ways upon pre-conceived notions and interpretations of the national interest and indeed 
‘security’, the events of 2001-2003 in particular allowed for a significant change in the 
way security was viewed in Australia. Among other developments, this period witnessed 
an unprecedented attempt to portray asylum-seekers as threats to Australian security and 
involved the first deployment of Australian troops without bipartisan support since the 
Vietnam War. It may indeed be argued that this period saw a general shift from a realist 
security discourse, invoked directly by the conservative Australian government at times, 
to one bearing significant resemblance to the neo-conservative conception of security in 
the United States, with its associated primacy of the global promotion of political and 
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social ‘values’ and willingness to use force to achieve transformation in global politics. 
The two major statements on foreign policy published by the Coalition government, in 
1997 and 2003, are instructive here. While the overview of the 1997 Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade White Paper emphasised the need to be realistic about the 
‘hard-headed pursuit’ of Australia’s national interests, for example, the 2003 White 
Paper’s overview’s first page was dedicated to the discussion of ‘Australia’s values’, a 
discussion that had been absent altogether from the 1997 document.34
 
 Certainly, the 
emphasis on particularistic values and identity, combined with a politics of fear, was 
central to the Australian government’s approach to questions of both asylum-seekers and 
terrorism from 2001. 
Asylum-seekers and Australian Security 
 
In August 2001, a Norwegian cargo ship, the MV Tampa, answered a distress call made 
by a sinking fishing boat outside Australian territorial waters. The Tampa diverted course 
and rescued 433 people who had been aboard the vessel, all of whom were aiming to 
reach Australia in order to seek asylum. After originally aiming to return to Indonesia 
(from where the asylum-seekers had embarked), the Tampa made towards the Australian 
territory of Christmas Island. Before it could reach the island, however, the Australian 
government issued an order for the Australian navy to intercept the Tampa and to prevent 
it from docking on the island (which would have obliged the Australian government to 
process the claims of the asylum-seekers). A two week stand-off between the navy and 
the Tampa followed, in which period the Australian government fully enunciated a 
commitment to prevent asylum-seekers from entering Australian waters illegally. Indeed, 
the government’s subsequent approach to asylum-seekers attempting to reach Australia’s 
migration zone by boat saw a continuation of the principles it elaborated, and the stand it 
took, regarding the Tampa.  
 
Using Australia’s approach to asylum-seekers as a basis for investigating the construction 
of security in the contemporary Australian context might appear somewhat unusual, 
given its superficial marginality to the focus of traditional security policy and analysis. A 
number of points are worth noting here, however, in underscoring the relevance of this 
example to security. First, the language the government used in defining its approach to 
asylum seekers demonstrated that as far as the government was concerned, the issue of 
illegal entry of asylum-seekers was a security issue. As Don McMaster notes, 
‘maintaining national sovereignty and security and protecting Australia’s borders were 




Second, the relationship between Australia’s approach to asylum-seekers and security 
may be viewed in the deployment of military resources and personnel to ‘protect’ 
Australia from the threat posed by the asylum-seekers. This is an important point if, as 
Didier Bigo argues,36 the actions of security ‘professionals’ such as military personnel 
play a role not simply in realising security policy, but in influencing the way in which 
security is perceived and constructed in the broader political community. The deployment 
of military resources in this sense can be viewed as significant given the meaning 
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portrayed to the Australian population: of the need for Australia’s defence forces to 
protect the borders of the Australian state (and indeed islands in its migration zone) from 
violation. Finally, and most directly, the government invoked the tragic circumstances of 
September 11 (which occurred while the furore over the Tampa was ongoing) to justify 
its approach to asylum-seekers and migration policy in general. For a number of 
government ministers, and for Prime Minister Howard himself, the events of September 
11 underscored the need for vigilance about migration practices and even raised the 
spectre of terrorists hiding themselves among asylum-seekers attempting to reach 
Australian territory.37
 
 The conflation of these two concerns (border protection and 
terrorism) may be viewed here as a particularly important representation on the 
government’s part: of demonstrating a particular conception of security and serving to 
create a context in which its policy on asylum-seekers was even more acceptable to the 
Australian population. These points, particularly the way in which this security discourse 
was evoked and a relationship between asylum-seekers and terrorists was drawn, require 
some elaboration.  
From the outset, the Australian government articulated the view that the issue of asylum-
seekers arriving by boat was a security issue, particularly in terms of the threat posed to 
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Australian state. Prime Minister Howard 
argued at the time that: 
 
It is in the national interest that this vessel not be allowed to stay in Australian territorial 
waters…It is in the national interest that we have the power…to prevent, beyond any 
argument, people infringing the sovereignty of this country.38
 
  
This conception of the problem of asylum-seekers was reiterated by other senior 
ministers in the Howard government. Foreign Minister Downer noted that ‘at the heart of 
this (the Tampa issue) is the protection of our territorial integrity’,39 while Defence 
Minister Peter Reith noted that ‘if you can’t control who comes into your country, that is 
a security issue’.40 Immigration Minister Phillip Ruddock echoed the concerns 
underpinning the formation of the Immigration Restriction Act (known popularly as the 
White Australia Policy) at the turn of the twentieth century in arguing that Australia 
could be ‘overrun with large numbers of asylum seekers’.41
 
 All of these representations 
served to position asylum-seekers as violating Australian sovereignty, undermining the 
security of the Australian state, and ultimately involved denying ethical responsibility to 
those outside of Australia’s borders. The government also frequently invoked the 
strategic language of deterrence in arguing that its approach to the issue would send a 
message to would-be people-smugglers and asylum-seekers that Australia was not a ‘soft 
touch’. This language may also be viewed as an attempt to influence the way Australians 
thought about asylum-seekers: as ‘others’ seeking to exploit the good will of the 
Australian people. 
The events of September 11 saw the most direct attempts on the government’s part to 
position asylum-seekers as threats to Australian security. Defence Minister Reith argued 
that the open entry of asylum-seekers could allow for a ‘pipeline for terrorists to come in 
and use (the) country as a staging post for terrorist activities’.42 He also argued that the 
evens of September 11 made him ‘determined to have an immigration program which the 
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government is able to conduct with integrity’.43
 
 A government member of parliament, 
Peter Slipper, went further in stating that there was: 
An undeniable link between illegals and terrorists…Many of these illegals come from 
Afghanistan (and) it is not beyond the realms of possibility that some people gaining 
illegal entry into Australia this way are people who have been involved in terrorism or 
who do represent a threat to this country.44
 
  
While Prime Minister Howard noted that he did not want to ‘exaggerate links between 
terrorism and illegal immigration’, he also stated that on ‘the question of character 
background of some of the people who have sought to come to this country illegally, the 
evidence is mixed. Some of them have criminal records’.45 He further noted that in the 
wake of September 11, Australia had a redoubled obligation to check who was entering 
the country.46
 
 Given the extent of public concern about the threat of terrorism post-
September 11, such a representation may be seen as particularly significant in both 
enabling the government to pursue its asylum-seeker policy with widespread public 
support, and furthering a particular conception of security in which Australia needed to 
be protected from the threat posed by asylum-seekers.  
 Asylum-Seekers, Security and Contestation 
  
Of course, the government’s approach to asylum-seekers was, as security always is, 
contested by a range of actors both domestically and internationally. A range of actors on 
the international stage (including individual states, NGOs and the UN High Commission 
on Refugees) argued that the Australian government’s position revoked core norms and 
rules of international society, particularly regarding human rights.47 This arguably 
positioned the individual security of asylum-seekers as pre-eminent in considerations of 
how states should respond to this issue itself. A number of analysts and critics also 
pointed out that in spite of a developing international consensus on the need to address 
the problem of people-movements at its origins rather than through preventing them 
access,48 the Australian government seemed committed to the latter strategy, reflecting a 
concern only with protecting Australia from asylum-seekers rather than addressing the 
problem of asylum-seekers. McMaster argues that this was reflected in the government’s 
expenditures in dealing with asylum-seekers. He notes that predictions of the 
government’s spending on ‘locating, removing and detaining asylum-seekers’ in 2002 
were in excess of $200 million, compared with ‘only around $14 million to the UNHCR 




Other critical voices described the government’s position as a populist one, playing upon 
fears in the electorate about a ‘flood of refugees’ in order to shore up domestic support 
for its approach and for the government in general.51 Opposition and minor political 
parties noted the significance of the timing of the Tampa crisis in this context: weeks 
before a federal election at a time when the government was behind in opinion polls.52 
The timing and nature of the government’s approach was also a basis for criticism given 
that immigration issues had traditionally been kept out of the public domain given the 
divisive nature of these concerns, and that (despite the language of the government) the 
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numbers of those reaching Australia by boat was relatively small in a global context.53 
Australian Democrats leader Natasha Stott-Despoja argued that ‘the opportunity to link 
terrorism and boat people and to create unnecessary fear and distrust in the Australian 
population towards asylum-seekers (was) apparently electorally irresistible to some 
members of this government’.54 These criticisms involved a direct attempt to argue that 
the government was representing security in a particular way: one that was statist, 
exclusionary and excessively concerned with reactive and aggressive responses to 
political problems for the benefit of the government itself. 55
 
 Such criticisms may also be 
viewed as an acknowledgement of the role of security as a legitimating strategy, in the 
sense that these critics recognised the potential (electoral) benefit of invoking security 
regarding this issue.  
The Australian government responded to many of the concerns noted above by reiterating 
their ultimate concern with Australian security and Australia’s national interests, and 
(significantly) by portraying critics as un-Australian, unconcerned about Australian 
sovereignty and security and even as sympathetic to the motives of terrorists. The 
government responded to international criticism by invoking sovereignty and portraying 
Australia as being victimised by the international community. Foreign Minister Downer 
argued that ‘whatever the rights and wrongs of these issues, we will decide them 
ourselves, not have bureaucrats in Geneva decide them for us’.56 Prime Minister Howard 
also criticised the UN, noting that ‘it seems in the eyes of some on the United Nations 
that the really democratic countries in the world are easy game for attack’.57 Strongest 
criticism was perhaps reserved for critics at the domestic level, however. A government 
member of parliament accused the opposition, who had blocked legislation aimed at 
excising territories from Australia’s migration zone, of not having ‘..any national spirit; 
they do not want to support this country’.58 Another member of parliament noted that the 
opposition was ‘not standing up for national sovereignty’.59 A minor party representative 
also noted that she (and others in her party opposing the government’s wide-ranging 
legislative responses to asylum-seekers) were accused by members of the government of 
‘not sympathising with victims (of September 11) and having sympathy for terrorists’.60
 
  
Describing those opposed to the government’s policy on asylum-seekers as unconcerned 
about Australian national interests or even being ‘un-Australian’ may be viewed in two 
ways: either as an attempt to marginalise these voices from the policy process and the 
construction of security by portraying them as unconcerned about the nation’s core values 
and interests; or as a form of what Bially Mattern describes as ‘representational force’, 
which enables the ‘user’ to ‘bluntly, self-interestedly and non-negotiably compel his 
victim to abide by his version of some contested story’.61 In many ways, the 
government’s representation of critics of its approach as ‘un-Australian’ bears 
resemblance to its depiction of asylum-seekers themselves: as others of whom Australia 
was in need of being protected. The depiction of asylum-seekers as others was 
particularly apparent in the government’s erroneous claims that subsequent asylum-
seekers had risked the lives of their children by throwing them overboard, 62 and its claim 
that the asylum-seekers were ‘queue jumpers’.63 It was also evident in the government’s 
use of the term ‘illegals’ to describe asylum-seekers arriving by boat, and arguably in its 
refusal to allow media outlets to photograph asylum-seekers, a policy some argued was 
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designed to prevent ‘humanising images’ of asylum-seekers from being published. 64
  
 
Crucially, the government’s representations of both asylum-seekers and critics of its 
approach indicated a desire to marginalise those critical voices and foreclose 
opportunities for empathy for asylum-seekers to develop in the wider Australian 
population.  
The Australian government received widespread public support for its approach to the 
issue of asylum-seekers from 2001, which was most explicitly captured in dynamics 
concerning the asylum-seekers on board the Tampa. National opinion polls indicated that 
a vast majority of Australians supported the government’s stance,65 and the government’s 
subsequent federal election victory was viewed by many as a vindication, if not a direct 
result, of its approach to this problem and its associated conception of security.66 Some 
argue that the support for the government’s policies here was the result of its success in 
tapping into a darker element of Australian identity,67 while for others the success of the 
government in capturing the way security was conceptualised and addressed in this 
context was primarily owed to ‘the Australian people (becoming) conditioned to fear the 
arrival of asylum-seekers’,68
 
 a project furthered by the government’s conceptualisation of 
this issue.  
Certainly, the government’s misrepresentation of asylum-seekers as potential terrorists, 
and its false claim that asylum-seekers had thrown children overboard, seem to validate 
the argument that the Australian government’s representations of the issue were aimed at, 
and ultimately successful in, enabling its policy approach and in constructing security in 
certain ways. Its portrayal of critics of its approach as ‘un-Australian’ and as attempting 
to undermine Australia’s sovereign rights may also be viewed here as an attempt to 
marginalise these actors from the construction of security, and to maximise the resonance 
of its own security discourse within the Australian population. These dynamics, and the 
government’s commitment to this particular conception of security, were furthered by the 
terrorist incidents of September 11 and Bali, and again evident in the government’s 
approach to conflict in Iraq.    
 
Terrorism and the War in Iraq  
 
While the Tampa situation may be viewed as a constructed security crisis in many ways, 
it would seem that the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 and in Bali in October 
2002 constituted a material change in the global and regional security environment for 
Australia. Indeed, this was precisely how the Prime Minister represented these events: as 
signalling that Australia was confronted with a ‘new and very dangerous security’ 
environment.69
 
 While recognising the scope and significance of these events, however, it 
is still important to reflect on the ways in which they were interpreted, represented and 
acted upon in an Australian context.  
As noted, the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States coincided with 
continuing furore over the government’s approach to the Tampa asylum-seekers in 2001. 
In many ways, the Australian approach to September 11, and particularly to the 
subsequent US-led ‘war on terror’, saw a continuation of a conception of security defined 
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in statist, exclusionary and militaristic terms. 22 Australians were killed on September 
11, and there was a significant emotional response within Australia to images of the 
attacks and their aftermath.70 The immediate response of the Australian government was 
to condemn the attacks as acts of ‘barbarism’, a sentiment echoed throughout the world. 
More significantly in the context of this paper, the Australian government pledged 
support for the US military response within three days of the attacks and before a 
clarification of the specific target of the military response. In doing so, the Australian 
government invoked the 1951 ANZUS treaty, which was the first time either the United 
states or Australia had invoked the treaty ‘to justify any form of military cooperation’.71
 
   
At the domestic level, the Australian government sought to portray the attacks on 
September 11 as an attack on the values shared by Australians and Americans, and in a 
manner that positioned Australia’s subsequent military role in intervention in Afghanistan 
as an act of self defence. Prime Minister Howard argued that the September 11 terrorist 
action constituted ‘an attack on the way of life we hold dear in common with 
Americans’.72
  
 He later argued that: 
If we left this contest [the war on terror] only to America, we would be leaving it to them 
to defend our rights and those of all the other people of the world who have a 
commitment to freedom and liberty. We will not do that…Australians have always been a 
people prepared to fight their own fights.73
 
  
Such a representation, of the war on terror as an act of self-defence, may be viewed as an 
attempt to legitimise a military intervention to the Australian population. The Australian 
government initially deployed 122 troops to Afghanistan in the subsequent ‘war on 
terror’ without a public announcement, and by the end of the conflict in Afghanistan had 
sent 1550 troops, eight military and support aircraft, two frigates and an amphibious 
command ship. Such a commitment was arguably not central to the success of the 
military mission, but was significant in demonstrating the extent of Australia’s 




In October 2002, a terrorist attack on the Indonesian island of Bali seemed to validate 
concerns about the potential for terrorism to spread globally, and particularly into 
Australia’s region. 202 people were killed in this terrorist attack, which was carried out 
by Asian-based radical Islamic group Jemaah Islamiah, a group with suspected links to 
Al-Qaeda. Of the 202 dead, 88 were Australians, which meant that more Australians were 
killed in this attack than had been killed in all terrorist incidents since 1915.75 Coming a 
little over a year after September 11, the primacy of security concerns associated with 
violent threats to Australia and Australians may have been inevitable in political 
discourse and in the way in which security was conceptualised and addressed in the 
Australian context. In fact, it may be argued that the Australian government was 
compelled to respond aggressively to Bali, given the extent of public anger over this 
tragic event. It is worth reiterating here that it is possible to conceive of security as 
constraining: as placing limits on what political leaders can do based on dominant 
concerns within the broader domestic populace. While an important acknowledgement, it 
is also imperative to recall that security can be enabling: if a political leader, for example, 
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can convince a domestic population that particular actions serve the end of ‘security’, 
those actions may subsequently be enabled or legitimised. It is in this context that it is 
imperative to reflect on the ways that meaning was given to this event (and September 
11) by the government in conditioning the way security was conceived in the broader 
Australian context.  
 
In responding to the Bali bombing, Prime Minister Howard argued that this terrorist 
attack underscored the need to expand Australia’s military capacity in order to best 
ensure Australian security. He noted that ‘I think it is inevitable (post-Bali) that we will 
have to spend even more on defence…that’s just inevitable’.76
 
 This particular 
representation may be viewed as an example of the ways in which a particular 
interpretation of an event/ problem (ie that terrorism requires aggressive, military 
responses to defeat it) can be cast as apolitical, inevitable, or as ‘common sense’. This is 
a powerful representational strategy, one that masks a particular interpretation and 
particular assumptions about what security means and how it can be realised in the 
language of inevitability.  
More significant in terms of the meaning given to the Bali bombings was the 
government’s attempt to link the bombings themselves with the imperative for Australia 
to militarily support US intervention in Iraq. While the bombings came several months 
before Australia officially committed troops to the US-led Iraq intervention in March 
2003, the Australian government had made it clear prior to Bali that it supported the US 
stance on Iraq,77 allowing for criticisms that Australia’s position on Iraq had made 
Australians the target of terrorists. While the Australian government played down the 
extent to which there was a relationship between the Bali bombings and its stance on Iraq 
in this sense, it did argue that the events of Bali underscored the need for intervention in 
Iraq. At a direct level, the Trade Minister Mark Vaile speculated about the possible 
involvement of the Iraqi regime in the Bali bombings, in spite of any evidence to support 
this claim.78 Less directly, the government sought to advance the argument that rogue 
states such as Iraq could sell weapons of mass destruction to terrorists, thereby increasing 
the potential for greater carnage in future terrorist attacks. 79
  
 The Prime Minister went 
further in arguing, prior to officially committing Australia to intervention and in the face 
of significant domestic opposition to Australian involvement, that: 
We lost 88 Australians in Bali because of a wilful act of international terrorism…and I 
will, amongst other things, be asking Australians to bear those circumstances in mind if 
we become involved in military conflict with Iraq.80
 
  
Such a representation may be viewed as an attempt on the government’s part to play upon 
popular concern about terrorism in the wake of Bali in order to justify intervention in 
Iraq. Fundamentally, then, such a representation can be seen as an attempt to construct 
public support for an aggressive response to the (possible) development of weapons of 
mass destruction in Iraq. Australia’s support for the war in Iraq was, I argue here, 
inseparable from the primacy of the US alliance in the Australian government’s security 
outlook,81
 
 one underpinned by a conception of the world in realist terms.    
 Terrorism, Intervention in Iraq and Contestation 
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Critical responses to the government’s security discourse regarding terrorism were 
somewhat circumscribed by the tragedy of events on September 11 and in Bali. Indeed, 
as Williams argues, ‘it was difficult for the Opposition Labor Party’s leaders to question 
(the government’s) counterterrorism measures without seeming unpatriotic or not having 
the best security interests of the nation at heart’.82 The government, as will be noted, 
played an important role in constructing perceptions of opposition in this way. In spite of 
these limitations, a number of actors contested the way in which the Australian 
government had represented security and Australia’s national interests in terms of the 
meaning it gave to events on September 11, in Bali and regarding the war in Iraq. A 
range of analysts noted that Australia’s over-arching commitment to the US approach to 
the ‘war on terror’ could potentially undermine Australia’s regional relationships.83
 
 This 
is a particularly significant criticism given the apparent imperative of cooperating with 
states such as Indonesia over asylum-seeker movements and responding to terrorism.  
Other critics of the government’s response to terrorism noted that to the extent that 
Australia did pursue diplomatic and law-enforcement cooperation with the Indonesian 
military over terrorism, this involved working with the Indonesian military’s (TNI) anti-
terrorist group, Kopassus, a group widely criticised for their role in human rights 
violations in Aceh.84 In the context of its commitment to the broader war on terror, still 
others argued that Australia might have used its close relations with the United States to 
encourage it to pursue more fully multilateral responses to terrorism, and combine its 
aggressive military approach with more diffuse and long-term actions to eliminate future 
threats of terrorism.85 Such a criticism positioned Australia’s militaristic response to 
terrorism as a particular choice based on a particular interpretation rather than an 
inevitable course of action. For other critics of the government, the government’s 
depiction of the evil regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq threw into stark relief its hardline 
approach to asylum-seekers, a significant percentage of whom were fleeing persecution 
in these countries.86 Jim George, meanwhile, argued that Australia’s role in the war on 
terror and in Iraq, along with the ‘militaristic mind-set associated with it’, was ‘likely to 
provoke the very instability and disorder it ostensibly (sought) to quell, thus increasing 
regional and global insecurity’.87
 
  
A number of actors also pointed to the particular representational strategies of the 
government in responding to terrorism, arguing that the Australian government was 
attempting to ‘use’ terrorism to further justify a militaristic, statist and exclusionary 
approach to security. Opposition political parties, political commentators and parents of 
children killed in the Bali bombings argued that the Howard government was cynically 
attempting to exploit the deaths of those killed in Bali in order to justify intervention in 
Iraq.88 Others argued more generally that the Howard government was attempting to 
augment fears of terrorism to enable not only intervention in Iraq, but also to justify 
controversial domestic anti-terrorism legislation and even to further its own electoral 
support.89 At this level, it was not simply the security discourse and the course of action 
to which the Australian government was committed that was a basis for criticism, but 
also the ways in which the Australian government sought to create support for these 
actions and to engender support for the government itself.  
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The responses of the Howard government to such criticisms bore significant resemblance 
to its response to criticisms about its actions regarding the Tampa. It sought to once again 
marginalise critics based on their lack of concern about Australian security and 
Australians generally. On the question of whether Australia’s support for war in Iraq had 
made Australia more of a target for terrorists, the Prime Minister positioned critics as not 
standing up to the perpetrators of wrongful acts, arguing that history showed that no state 
could ‘buy itself permanent protection (by) speaking softly of evil’.90
 
 The Prime Minister 
also responded to criticisms from the Opposition that the government was trying to use 
Bali to justify Iraq in arguing that: 
This [Bali] is an event that has horrified Australians beyond the partisan political divide 
and what they want of their political leaders right now is a united cohesive response and 
they will have no patience with the use of this issue for partisan political remarks.91
 
  
Such a representation of the Opposition’s criticisms not only served to draw attention 
away from the government’s invocation of the Bali tragedy to justify intervention in Iraq, 
but also served to question the motives of critics and the extent to which these critics 
were concerned with the well-being and security of Australia and Australians. 
 
The government also targeted international actors in its attempt to further domestic 
support for its stance and in its attempt to marginalise those critical of Australia’s 
militaristic approach to Iraq. Aware of the importance of the UN position on intervention 
in Iraq for the extent of support Australian military involvement could expect 
domestically, 92
 
 Prime Minister Howard sought to denigrate those actors standing in the 
way of a Security Council resolution, questioning their motives for opposing a resolution 
enabling UN action. He argued that:  
We won’t achieve…peaceful disarmament [of Iraq] if we continue to have spoiling 
tactics from, say, the French, who appear intent on saying no to everything irrespective of 
its merit… I think France has always regretted the… absolute rise of the United States as 
the pre-eminent world power.93
 
  
He went further still in arguing that ‘appeasing’ Iraq bore resemblance to the 
appeasement approach taken to Nazi Germany prior to World War II,94
 
 and in arguing 
that the very credibility of the United Nations was at stake regarding Iraq: 
If the Security Council doesn’t pass the resolution I think it will have failed a test. If it… 




These representations of the reality of the world and Australia’s role in it after September 
11 and the Bali bombings may all be viewed as attempts to portray a militaristic and 
aggressive response to terrorism as the only legitimate way in which Australia could be 
protected and could respond to the new and ‘dangerous’ security environment. This 
spilled over, for the government, into a justification of intervention in Iraq and an implicit 
criticism of those opposed to intervention as placating or tolerating ‘evil’, or being 
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unconcerned about Australian (or indeed global) security. While the government’s 
intervention in Iraq took place in the face of continued domestic political opposition, 96 
political commentator Denis Shanahan argues that the government ultimately wore down 
opposition to its stance after the deployment of troops, 97 in part through representing the 
conflict as an attempt to rid the world of the evil of Saddam Hussein and also through 
arguing that Australians should support the troops who were putting their lives at risk to 
achieve this end.98 Indeed, Shanahan argued that in this context, ‘Howard has driven the 
polls’.99
 
 This process may also be described as the successful creation of a context in 
which the government’s actions, and its associated discourse of security, resonated with 
the Australian population. 
Towards an Alternative Security Discourse? 
 
The preceding analysis is not to suggest that all individual policies or events are 
interpreted by the government solely according to this statist, exclusionary and 
militaristic conception of security. It was, after all, the same Australian government that 
had led an intervention/ peacekeeping force in East Timor in 1999, and the same 
government that at the time of writing had outlined a $1 billion assistance package to the 
Indonesian government in response to the horrific effects of the tsunami at the end of 
2004. Neither of these policies would suggest a government devoid of compassion in its 
external relations. In recognising these exceptions to the generally militaristic, statist and 
exclusionary conception of Australian security held by the Australian government, it is 
worth noting that while core themes may exist no single security discourse ever 
completely captures the way a particular political community conceives of itself and the 
world around it.  
 
When combined with limited but nevertheless progressive changes in asylum-seeker 
policy in 2003 and 2004,100 these examples serve to remind us that there are always 
possibilities for change or exceptions to broader patterns of foreign and security policy. 
This, in turn, should encourage us to investigate more fully the conditions in which 
alternative security discourses and practices become possible. Crucially, public 
mobilisation has been central to the government’s policies on all of these issues, although 
(significantly) in areas in which US foreign policy imperatives were not implicated. This 
latter point is an important caveat to note, particularly given that the belief in the need for 
this alliance has even led to the government commenting on its lack of choice on issues 
such as Iraq, wherein Australian involvement was conceptualised as necessary to 
maintain the alliance and therefore ensure the security of Australia and Australians.101
 
 
Once again, this range of factors remind us of the need to conceive of security as 
enabling and constraining, and to view future security prospects in terms of both 
opportunity and limits.  
The difficulty in relying upon public mobilisation or concern to force progressive 
changes in security conceptions and practices rests on a number of bases. First, while 
focusing in this analysis on the role of the Australian government, numerous other 
influential actors have echoed and/or supported the government’s position on issues such 
as asylum-seekers and terrorism,102 a situation making the emergence and resonance of 
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marginalised and progressive voices on these issues all the more difficult. Second, and 
related to the proceeding point, public opinion may support statist, militaristic and 
exclusionary practices, as was the case concerning Australia’s approach to asylum-
seekers. That this public opinion or support for the government’s position may be 
constructed, and that it does not preclude the possibility of alternative practices emerging, 
does not negate the fact that public opposition may be an important immediate obstacle to 
the emergence of more normatively progressive security conceptions and practices. 
Finally, on some issues the government has proved singularly unwilling to allow public 
opposition to alter its preferred policy options. This has particularly been the case 
regarding commitment to the war in Iraq.  
 
There are, nonetheless, immanent possibilities for change in the way in which security is 
conceived, located largely in the marginalised voices contesting government policy and 
pointing to the inherent inconsistencies in the government’s approach. The empowerment 
of these voices is central to recognising possibilities for progressive change, as the 
example of change in asylum-seeker policy demonstrates. On issues relating to asylum-
seekers, for example, critics have pointed variously to Australia’s limited financial 
commitment to the UNHCR relative to expenditure on interception and incarceration of 
asylum-seekers; to its portrayal of asylum-seekers as potential terrorists in spite of the 
absence of evidence to support this claim or the fact that many asylum-seekers are fleeing 
countries who the government itself has described as ‘evil’; and to the fact that in the 
past, the Australian government had responded to influxes of asylum-seekers 
(Indochinese refugees in the 1970s, for example) without recourse to the language of 
border protection and security.103 Similarly, on the issue of Australia’s response to 
terrorism, critics have noted that Australia’s approach to the war on terror risks alienating 
regional neighbours; fails to recognise or engage constructively with the sources of 
terrorism; and even makes Australia and Australians more of a target for terrorist activity, 
a claim supported by reports from the government’s chief intelligence body, ASIO, 
regarding Australian involvement in Iraq.104 Some critics have also argued that on these 
issues, the government has engaged in the politics of fear in order to create support for 




While arguably having little immediate influence on the way security has been 
conceptualised and addressed in the contemporary Australian context, acknowledging 
alternative voices is in itself important, particularly if security is, as I have argued it 
should be, conceived as an inter-subjective construction. Once we acknowledge the inter-
subjective nature of security, we allow ourselves to recognise the importance of a range 
of actors to the security project, and the inherent possibility for change in the meaning 
associated with security. When combined with the more tangible implications of 
Australian security policy (such as increasing damage to Australia’s international 
reputation; the failure to locate WMD in Iraq; and the continued and mounting casualties 
there), marginalised voices promoting alternative security discourses may provide the 
bases for changes in the way in which security is understood and practiced in the 
Australian context, even in spite of the re-election of the Howard government in October 
2004.     
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Security policy is a site of contestation between different groups who hold often radically 
different conceptions of which values and actors are in need of protection, by whom, 
through what means and from what threats. Some actors, such as the Australian 
government, possess greater capacity to influence the way security is conceptualised and 
addressed, leading some to lament the inevitability of security being constructed in such a 
way as to serve the interests of the powerful.106
 
 While focusing on the role of the 
Australian government in constructing security in the period in question, this article has 
also sought to point to immanent possibilities for progressive change, largely through an 
immanent critique of the government’s approach to security and through identifying 
marginalised actors contesting the government’s security narrative. The Australian 
government’s security approach is far from inevitable or necessary: it is, rather, 
constituted by a series of choices based upon a particular interpretation of Australian 
security, one which can be contested and should be acknowledged as an interpretation 
rather than a depiction of, or response to, a global ‘reality’. This inherently contestable 
nature of security points to possibilities for a movement towards an alternative 
conception of security, one which is not based on assumptions about the ubiquitous 
nature of threats to Australia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, which does not 
encourage a denial of ethical responsibility to the vulnerable beyond the borders of the 
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